Financial Provision on Divorce or Dissolution (England and Wales)
Description
Law (Comparative Scottish and English Family Law) Mind Map on Financial Provision on Divorce or Dissolution (England and Wales), created by Ruaraidh Simpson on 24/04/2017.
Financial Provision on Divorce or
Dissolution (England and Wales)
The law relating to financial orders on
divorce and dissolution is to be found in
Part II (s.21 to 40A) of the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973 and Sch. 5 of the Civil
Partnership Act 2004
These acts do not set out principles that
determine how a couples' property is to be
shared on divorce or dissolution they
simply state that the court is to have
regard to all the circumstances of the case
and that the welfare of the parties' minor
children is to be its first consideration,
there is a further general requirement that
the court must consider whether it is
possible to make a "clean break"
Wide Disctretion
The Acts give the
court a wide
discretion to make
orders for sharing,
selling or settling
property and for the
payment of
maintenance, both
for the adults and for
any children
There is though, a
set of statutory
criteria - guidance
- on the basis of
which the court
will choose what
orders to make
This guidance is
set out in s.25 of
the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973
(and in equivalent
wording in sch.5
pt.5 s.21(2) of the
Civil Partnership
Act 2004)
Factors to Consider as Specified in s.25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
(1) it shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise
its powers under s.23/24/24A/24B and 24E and, if so, in what
manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, the
first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any
child of the family who has not attained the age of 18
(2) as regards the exercise of powers of the court under s.23(1)(a),
(b), or (c) 24, 24A, 24B, or 24E in relation to a party to the marriage
the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other
financial resources which each of the parties to the
marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable
future, including in the case of earning capacity, any
increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of
the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage
to take steps to acquire
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities
which each of the parties to the marriage has or is
likely to have in the foreseeable future
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the
family before the breakdown of the marriage
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and
the duration of said marriage
(e) any physical or mental disability of
either of the parties to the marriage
(f) the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely to
make in the foreseeable future to make the welfare of the family, including
any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family
(g) the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it
would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it
(h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value
to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of
the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the
chance of acquiring
s.25 matters to which the court is to have
regard to in deciding how to exercise its
powers under s.23/24/24A/24B/24E
The order of the s.25 factors does not in any way
indicate priority and they are not exclusive
Per Lord Hoffman in Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR
1360, 1370: "s.25(2) of the [Matrimonial Causes Act 1973],
while listing the various matters to which particular regard
should be had, does not rank them in any kind of hierarchy.
Which of them will carry most weight must depend upon the
facts of the particular case
Law Commission in 2012 quoted from a 1999 article by
Professor Parkinson who likens the situation facing family
law judges; "... a bus driver who is given a large number of
instructions about how to drive the bus, and the authority to
do various actions such as turning left or right. There is also
the occasional advice or correction offered by three senior
drivers. The one piece of information which he or she is not
given is where to take the bus. All he or she is told is that the
driver is required to drive to a reasonable destination"
Analysis of the s.25 Criteria
Welfare of children; CA has made clear that this does not mean the welfare
of children is the overriding consideration
Suter v Suter and Jones [1987] 2 FLR 232
It is the most important factor, but not the only one
B v B (Financial Provision: Welfare of Child and Conduct) [2002] 1 FLR 555
COMPARABLE WITH
Peacock v
Peacock 1994
SLT 144
Leadbeater v
Leadbeater
[1985] 1 FLR
789
Financial Resources (s.25(2)(a))
Starting point - all assets considered
English approach -
assess all property to
decide how to meed the
needs of the parties
CANNOT take into account the
resources of a 3rd party
Although there are limited
exceptions to this rule
Financial Needs, Obligations and Responsibilities
(s.25(2)(b))
Needs are assessed subjectively - from the perspective of the particular spouses.
The needs of a rich couple are not the same as the needs of a poor couple. This was why the expression "reasonable requirements" emerged with regard to rich divorcing couples
Previous Standard of Living (s.25(2)(c))
Again, relevant for the very rich
evidence will have to be provided as to what expenditure was during the marriage -
lawyers for the weaker spouse will then argue that he/she spent X amount of money
Length of marriage a key factor
when the courts exercise discretion
In a short marriage, the court may be more likely to exclude non-MP
such as inheritances, or assets accrued before the marriage
C v C (Financial Provision: Short Marriage) [1997] 2 FLR 26
Miller v Miller [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 AC 618
Physical or Mental Disability (s.25(2)(e))
May have huge impact on proportions awarded
C v C (Financial Provision: Personal Damages) [1995] 2 FLR 171
Contributions to the Welfare of the Family (s.25(2)(f))
2 Key issues
1. Now settled that there should not be
discrimination between the contributions of the
money earner and the homemaker/childcarer
In White, Lord Nicholls stated: "If, in their respective spheres, each contributed equally to the
family, then in principle it matters not which of them earned the money and built up the
assets..."
2. Special contributions: if a spouse has generated
assets through particular hard work/entrepreneurial
flair, should that be a factor for said spouse to receive
more? Position - only in exceptional cases
Sorrell v Sorrell [2005] EWHC 1717 (Fam)
Charman v Charman No 4 [2007] EWCA Civ 503
The Conduct of the Parties (s.25(2)(g))
Watchel v Watchel [1973] Fam 72
conduct would only be considered where "obvious and gross"
Therefore, something more than responsibility for breaking down the marriage
Evans v Evans [1989] 1 FLR 351
K v L [2010] EWCA Civ 125
Evolution of Case
Law
Whilst the Acts do not set out principles about
dividing matrimonial/partnership property,
principles have been developed by the courts for
the exercise of the wide discretion which exists
Firstly, needs formally known as 'reasonable
requirements' in big money cases
needs include' provision
for income, provision for
accommodation, where
possible by the provision
of a capital sum, provision
for old age in the form of
pension capital, provision
for travel, holidays and
luxuries
Courts
understanding of
"needs"
extremely wide
If payee unlikely to become financially independent in the relatively
short term (3-5 years) the ideal is that an award to meet the needs
will enable the payee to live at the marital standard of living for life
Regularly not the case, after divorce a drop in the
quality of life can be expected in most cases
not enough
money to go
around
Courts therefore seek to establish a
reasonable standard of living for both
parties, albeit at a lower level of affluence
than was experienced during the marriage
Where the couple
were extremely
rich and assets far
surpass needs or
reasonable
requirements?
until 2000 where assets were more than sufficient,
no further financial adjustment was made, meaning
where most of the wealth stood in the name of one
party - usually the husband - the wife took no share
in such cases an applicant would
almost never receive more than
£10m - £12m, although a little
extra may have been awarded for
special circumstances
(particularly domestic or social)
£15m was essentially a ceiling
Conran v Conran [1997] 2 FLR 615
Reform of
Case Law
Change began after White v
White [2000] UKHL 54 at [24],
[2001] 1 AC 596 where Lord
Nicholls said "the present case is
a good illustration of the
unsatisfactory results which can
flow from the reasonable
requirements approach"
Stressing that "... there is one particular principle of
universal application which can be stated with
confidence. In seeking to achieve a fair outcome, there
is no place for discrimination between husband and
wife and their respective roles. Typically, a husband
and wife share the activities of earning money,
running their home and caring for their children.
Traditionally, the husband earned the money and the
wife looked after the home and children. This
traditional division of labour is no longer the order of
the dat. Frequently both parents work."
Despite the judgements that there was no starting point or principle of EQUAL division, White marked a sea of change
in the way that the courts began to allocate money on divorce. In Miller Lord Nicholls later said that "the glass ceiling
... was shattered by the decision ... in the White case". The decision therefore ushered in an entirely new approach
"sometimes it is the wife who is the
money earner and the husband runs
the home and cares for the children
during the day. But whatever the
division of labour chosen by the
husband and wife, or forced upon
them by circumstances, fairness
requires that this should not
prejudice or advantage either party"
where the assets exceed financial needs,
why should the surplus belong solely to the
husband? (or the money-earner) "I can see
nothing, either in the statutory provisions or
in the underlying objective of securing fair
financial arrangements to lead me to
suppose that the available assets of the
respondent become immaterial once the
claimant's wife's financial needs are
satisfied. Why ever should they?"
"Sometimes, having carried out the statutory exercise, the
judge's conclusion involves a more or less equal division of
the available assets. More often, this is not so/ More often
having looked at all the circumstances of the case the
judge's decision means that one party will receive a bigger
share than the other. Before reaching a firm conclusion ... a
judge would always be well advised to check his tentative
views against the yardstick of equality of division. As a
general guide, equality should be departed from if, and
only to the extent that, there is a good reason for doing so"
The aftermath and issues debated after White
how did a "yardstick of equal division" operate?
Was there a status for such criteria? No basis in statute
Exceptional circumstance
Charman v Charman (No.4)
HoL stated no gloss should be put on s.25 Factors, but it had imposed "fairness and equality" as glosses
Non-Matrimonial Property
What if the spouses' assets include property acquired
before the marriage or inheritance of the property?
Lord Nicholls in White; "... this
distinction between inherited property
and property owned before the
marriage is a recognition of the view,
widely but not universally held, that
property owned by one spouse before
the marriage, and inherited property
whenever acquired, stand on a different
footing from what may be loosely called
matrimonial property"
Plainly, when present, this factor is one of the circumstances of
the case. It represents a contribution made to the welfare of the
family by one of the parties to the marriage. The judge should
take into account. He should decide how important this is in the
particular case. The nature and value of the property, and the
time when and circumstances in which the property was
acquired, are among the relevant matters to be considered.
However, in the ordinary course, this factor can be expected to
carry little weight, if any, in a case where the claimant's financial
needs cannot be met without recourse to this property
included
inherited/acquired
before marriage
but did not share
50/50
Husbands net
worth of around
£22m from a farm
inherited by family,
wife given 3rd of
matrimonial assets
of around £8m
Jones v Jones [2011] EWCA
Civ 41, [2012] Fam 1
excluded property
inherited/acquired
before marriage
but split remaining
MP 50/50
husbands
company
valuated at
£9m, assets of
£16m, based
on sharing
principle wife
should have
received £8m
but decided
that shares of
husband would
not be
considered MP
Miller and McFarlane
three elements or strands which are readily
discernible in a fair financial split
1. Meeting of Needs
2. Giving of compensation
Sharing - being the division of material assets and
that being equal subject to provision for needs
based on two principles - one being
equality i.e. breadwinners
contributions not to be valued more
highly than domestic contributions
the other being that marriage is a
partnership, natural for
partnership property to be shared
at the end of the relationship,
same for Scotland and continental
Europe
Compensation
McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24
Miller-McFarlane guidance - the three strands will be prioritised by
categorisation of wealth
Most recently discussed in SA v PA [2014] EWHC 392 (Fam) per
Mostyn J: family assets of £3.8m, matrimonial home worth £2.2m,
considered the husband would have to retire within the following 5
years, high rate of pension, main issue in case was compensation
for wife who had given up working, had been a lawyer before giving
up work to have children. In this case compensation was not
relevant, not convinced a track record of high earnings could be
followed. Giving up work was not her only option
(i) only in very exceptional cases will the principle of compensation be invoked
(ii) such a case will be one where the court can say without
any speculation i.e. with almost near certainty, that the
claimant gave up a very high earning career which had it
not been foregone would have led to earning at least
equivalent to that presently enjoyed by the respondent
(iii) such a high earning career will have been practised
by the claimant over an appreciable period during the
marriage. Proof of this track record is key
(iv) once these findings have been made compensation will
be reflected by fixing the periodical payments award (or
the multiplicand if this aspect is being capitalised by
Duxbury) towards the top end of the discretionary bracket
applicable for a needs assessment on the facts of the case
Compensation ought not to be reflected by a premium or
additional element on top of the needs based award
The Standard Cases
different issues arise in
standard cases than in
big money cases, they
are not a scale model
all that can be achieved
is an order that meets
the needs of both
parties, because there is
not enough MP to do any
more. indeed in most
cases there is insufficient
MP to do even that
B v B (Ancillary Relief)
[2008] EWCA Civ 284
Lord Justice Wail commented
"the big money cases which
have reached this court and
the HoL are, in my judgement,
of only limited assistance in
dealing with a case such as
the present, and of even less
assistance in dealing with
smaller cases in which there is
simply not enough money to
go around. Thus, as I see it,
the principal lesson to be
learned from the leading case
of White is that the court's
objective is to achieve an
outcome which is fair"
M v B (Ancillary Proceedings:
Lump Sum) [1998] 1 FLR 53
"In all these cases it is
one of the paramount
considerations, in
applying the s.25
criteria, to endeavour
to stretch what is
available to cover the
need of each for a
home. Particularly
where there are young
children involved.
Obviously, the primary
carer needs whatever
is available to make
the main home for the
children, but it is of
importance, albeit it is
of lesser importance,
that the other parent
should have a home of
his own where the
children can enjoy their
contact time with him."
There are cases where there is not enough to provide a home for either, or
only enough to provide a home for one, but in any case where there is, by
stretch and a degree of risk taking, the possibility of a division to enable both
to rehouse themselves, that is an exceptionally important consideration and
one which will almost invariably have a decisive impact on outcome
Big Money Cases
in wealthier cases where assets
exceed needs, the courts
generally make no order
specifically in respect of needs,
as needs are met by an award
of half the MP pursuant to the
sharing principle
this brings position in
England closer to that of the
position in Scotland
still important differences
equal division is not an
absolute rule
lack of clarity as to what
is or is not MP for
purpose of sharing
uncertainty where a marriage is short, or
where there is a form of unusual property -
whether pre-acquired, gifted, inherited, or
generated by exceptional and solo business
efforts of one party
"Clean Breaks" in ENGLAND and in SCOTLAND
s.25A(1) of the 1973 Act directs the court to consider
whether it would be appropriate to exercise its power
to make financial orders in such a way as to
terminate the parties' financial obligations to each
other "as soon after the grant of the decree as the
court considers just and reasonable"
Wright v Wright [2015] EWCA Civ 201
"may invoke capital orders or make order for
periodical payment "for such term as would in the
opinion of the court be sufficient to enable the
party in whose favour the order is made to adjust
without undue hardship to the termination of his
or her financial dependence on the other party"
see s.25A(2)
an order that
imposes no
ongoing
financial
obligation - in
particular one
that involves
only capital
orders, or only
an order for
division and
sale of
proceeds of
property - is
known as a
clean break
Orders which
provide for the
ending of
obligations in
the future by
imposing a
term upon
periodical
payments, is
known as a
deferred clean
break
only deferred if accompanied by a
direction pursuant to s.28(1A) of
the 1973 Act that there can be no
order to vary it in the future
payments can be
calculated by the
Duxbury formula
Duxbury v Duxbury [1987]
1 FLR 7, Waterman v
Waterman [1989] 1 FLR
380, CA
Agreements
What effects should be given to pre and post
nuptial agreements?
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [2011] 1 AC 534
under the English law, it is the court that is the arbiter
of the financial arrangements between the parties
when it brings a marriage to an end. A prior
arrangement between husband and wife is only one of
the matters to which the court will have regard
The court shall give effect to a nuptial agreement that is
freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of
its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it
would not be fair to hold the parties to the agreement
SA v PA [2014] EWHC 392 (Fam)
approach approved in
Granatino, Mostyn J; "although it
is true that the agreement was
entered into on the very eve of
the marriage, at a time when
the wife was pregnant, and
where she had only the
impartial but not strictly
independent advice of the
notary I am satisfied that the
wife freely entered into it with a
sufficiency of advice to enable
her to appreciate its
implications"
Orders
Acts enable the courts to make a wide range of orders set out in s.23
Order for periodical payments (periodical allowance)
Order for lump sums (order for the payment of a capital sum)
Order for the transfer, settlement or sale of property
(order for transfer or property or an incidental order
which includes an order for the sale of property)