Duty of Care

There are 5 instances where duty of care gives rise to a special test: (i) Liability for [blank_start]omissions[blank_end] (ii) [blank_start]Public authority[blank_end] liability (iii) [blank_start]Third party liability[blank_end] (iv) [blank_start]Psychiatric[blank_end] harm (v) [blank_start]Economic loss[blank_end]

Duty of care has gone through 3 main stages of development: 1. [blank_start]Donoghue v Stevenson[blank_end] Prior to this case, there were only instances of "[blank_start]liability[blank_end]". Negligence as a tort did not exist until [blank_start]1932.[blank_end] Donoghue created the principle of duty of care. The neighbourhood principle was established by [blank_start]Lord Atkin[blank_end]. This can be still be referred to in cases where there is a [blank_start]consumer-manufacturer[blank_end] relationship. 2. [blank_start]Anns v Merton[blank_end] B.C. Redefined [blank_start]duty of care[blank_end] to limit the amount of claims. [blank_start]Lord Wilberforce[blank_end] created a 2-stage test: 1. Sufficient relationship of [blank_start]proximity[blank_end] where D's [blank_start]carelessness[blank_end] may be likely to cause damage to P. 2. Considerations of whether there are any [blank_start]considerations[blank_end] which may limit the [blank_start]scope of duty[blank_end]. [blank_start]Murphy v Brentwood[blank_end] DC overruled the Anns test - the Courts recognised the importance of [blank_start]policy considerations[blank_end]. 3. [blank_start]Caparo Industries v Dickman[blank_end] Plc [blank_start]Tripartite[blank_end] test for duty of care: 1. Foreseeability ([blank_start]Bhamra v Dubb[blank_end]) 2. [blank_start]Proximity[blank_end] (added in the middle of the two [blank_start]Anns[blank_end] processes) 3. [blank_start]Fair, just and reasonableness[blank_end] (MacFarlane v [blank_start]Tayside[blank_end] HA)

[blank_start]Misfeasance[blank_end] = making things worse Non-feasance = failing to [blank_start]make things better[blank_end] [blank_start]Lord Hoffmann[blank_end] created the distinction in [blank_start]Stovin v Wise[blank_end]. Generally, there is [blank_start]no duty for omissions[blank_end] in tort law. This also applies to [blank_start]parents[blank_end], unless they created the [blank_start]dangerous[blank_end] situation.

The [blank_start]emergency services[blank_end] do not owe the public a duty of care ([blank_start]Capital and Counties v Hampshire CC[blank_end]), apart from the [blank_start]ambulance service[blank_end]. They owe a duty as soon as they [blank_start]accept the call[blank_end] from the individual.

A duty of [blank_start]affirmative action[blank_end]: The court will recognise three main situations. 1. D contributes to the [blank_start]initial situation of danger[blank_end] ([blank_start]Haynes v Harwood[blank_end]); 2. D [blank_start]assumes responsibility[blank_end] for C's [blank_start]welfare[blank_end] ([blank_start]Watson v BBBC[blank_end], Kent v Griffiths); and, 3. D's occupation of an [blank_start]office or position[blank_end] of responsibility

Special [blank_start]affirmative duties[blank_end]: [blank_start]Parent/child[blank_end] (Hahn v [blank_start]Conley[blank_end]; [blank_start]Perry[blank_end] v Harris; [blank_start]Surtees v Kingston[blank_end]) Teacher/[blank_start]pupil[blank_end] (Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis) Doctor/patient ([blank_start]Barnett v Chelsea[blank_end]) [blank_start]Property owners[blank_end] (Goldman v [blank_start]Hargrave[blank_end]) The Courts recognise that a [blank_start]duty[blank_end] is also owed to the [blank_start]rescuer[blank_end] by the person who created the [blank_start]dangerous situation[blank_end].

Public [blank_start]authority liability[blank_end] Public authorities are treated in a [blank_start]range of ways[blank_end] by the courts. [blank_start]Police[blank_end] officers are generally granted [blank_start]immunity[blank_end], whereas [blank_start]child workers[blank_end] are treated more harshly. They tend to be sued for an omission, but generally have no [blank_start]duty of care[blank_end] for [blank_start]omissions[blank_end]. [blank_start]Stovin v Wise[blank_end] Held: D was not liable for the road accident - it was a [blank_start]mere omission[blank_end] (basic no duty rule applied). [blank_start]Gorringe[blank_end] v Calderdale Met BC Held: the duty of the public authority could not be [blank_start]extended[blank_end] beyond their [blank_start]original common law duty[blank_end], which was to maintain the [blank_start]surface of the road[blank_end]. Drivers themselves are responsible for their own [blank_start]safety[blank_end] (Lord [blank_start]Scott[blank_end]).

X v [blank_start]Bedfordshire[blank_end] 5 separate claims all heard together simultaneously. 2 [blank_start]child abuse[blank_end] cases, 3 [blank_start]educational[blank_end] services cases 1st claim - [blank_start]5 siblings[blank_end] were abused by their parents. The [blank_start]local authorities[blank_end] were notified by [blank_start]numerous bodies[blank_end] but it took them [blank_start]5 years[blank_end] to do something about it. 2nd claim - a child identified his [blank_start]abuser[blank_end] by his first name. The local [blank_start]authority[blank_end] thought it was the mother's [blank_start]boyfriend[blank_end], however, it was the name of a [blank_start]former lodger[blank_end]. The local authority were quick to remove him from his [blank_start]home,[blank_end] so his mother brought a claim against them. 3rd, 4th and 5th claims - claims from claimants who were suing [blank_start]defendants[blank_end] in relation to their [blank_start]statutory functions[blank_end]. Cs argued that they had not been [blank_start]identified[blank_end] as having [blank_start]special educational needs[blank_end], and therefore this [blank_start]disadvantaged[blank_end] them later in life. The claims failed because there were 5 [blank_start]policy reasons[blank_end] making it unfair, unjust and [blank_start]unreasonable[blank_end] to impose a duty of care in those situations - 1. A [blank_start]common law duty of care[blank_end] would cut across the whole statutory system set up for the protection of children at risk. 2. The task of the local authority in dealing with such children is '[blank_start]extraordinarily difficult[blank_end].' 3. The spectre of liability would perhaps cause the local authorities to adapt a more cautious and defensive approach to their duties. 4. The uneasy relationship between the public authority employee and the [blank_start]child's parents[blank_end] would become a [blank_start]breeding ground for hopeless litigation.[blank_end] 5. There were [blank_start]alternative remedies[blank_end] available in the form of the [blank_start]statutory complaints[blank_end] procedures or an investigation by the local government ombudsman. In this case, [blank_start]Lord Browne-Wilkinson[blank_end] created an approach to duty in these situations - 1. Will the enquiry into D's conduct involve a consideration of any [blank_start]high-level policy matters[blank_end]? 2. Has the D authority acted [blank_start]wholly outside[blank_end] the ambit of its statutorily-conferred discretion. 3. At the fair, just and reasonableness stage of [blank_start]Caparo[blank_end], [blank_start]further policy considerations[blank_end] must be taken into account.

[blank_start]Jain v Trent Strategic Authority[blank_end] Local authority wrongly closed down a [blank_start]residential home[blank_end]. C's lost money and tried to sue D on the basis of [blank_start]mistake information[blank_end]. Held: the recognition of a duty of care in negligence [blank_start]negates[blank_end] policy - D [blank_start]did not[blank_end] owe C a duty of care.

[blank_start]Osman v Ferguson[blank_end] C wanted to sue the police for failing to [blank_start]arrest[blank_end] school teacher, Osman. Held: although C was a [blank_start]foreseeable victim[blank_end], it wasn't fair, [blank_start]just or reasonable[blank_end] to impose liability on the police and to expect them to [blank_start]defend themselves for civil litigation[blank_end]. Hill v [blank_start]Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police[blank_end] The [blank_start]Yorkshire Ripper[blank_end] case. C was the mother of the Yorkshire Ripper's latest victim, and wanted to sue the police for their failure to [blank_start]arrest[blank_end] him, which she argued led to the [blank_start]murder[blank_end] of her daughter. Held: it would be unfair to [blank_start]impose liability[blank_end] because the police could not have predicted that she would have been a [blank_start]victim[blank_end]. She had no [blank_start]special status[blank_end]. [blank_start]Policy argument[blank_end]: would cause [blank_start]defensive practice[blank_end] and [blank_start]misuse of scarce resources[blank_end] in further claims.

[blank_start]Osman v UK[blank_end] C argued that his [blank_start]right to a fair trial[blank_end] (Article [blank_start]6[blank_end]) had been breached. Held: the Court agreed - the [blank_start]Court of Appeal[blank_end] had been too quick to throw out his claim. This caused an uproar amongst academics and the judiciary - courts [blank_start]interpreted[blank_end] the decision as that they were never allowed to use policy in order to [blank_start]negate a duty[blank_end] arising in negligence. Barrett v [blank_start]Enfield[blank_end] C claimed against the local authority for [blank_start]everything[blank_end] that had gone wrong in his life. His mother had [blank_start]abused[blank_end] him, and the [blank_start]local authority[blank_end] should have ensured that he had stayed in contact with his [blank_start]birth mother[blank_end]. Held: the court struck out the claim as disclosing no [blank_start]reasonable[blank_end] cause of action. Eventually in the HL, C won his case. [blank_start]Phelps v Hillingdon[blank_end] The local authority failed to notice C's [blank_start]special educational needs[blank_end], and so he brought a claim for his failure to get a [blank_start]well-paid job.[blank_end] Held: D was liable. A local [blank_start]authority[blank_end] can be liable for its failures to provide appropriate [blank_start]special needs[blank_end] educational support to those it had a [blank_start]duty to educate[blank_end]. [blank_start]Z v UK[blank_end] The [blank_start]5 siblings[blank_end] from X v [blank_start]Bedfordshire[blank_end] brought a claim before the [blank_start]ECHR[blank_end] for a breach of Article 6. They assumed they would succeed after [blank_start]Osman[blank_end]. Held: claim rejected. [blank_start]The policy was considered[blank_end] carefully in Osman.

JD v [blank_start]East Berkshire[blank_end] [blank_start]3 cases[blank_end] in one. Parents were [blank_start]wrongly suspected[blank_end] of harming their children. [blank_start]Social workers[blank_end] removed the children from their homes. Parents sued the [blank_start]local authority[blank_end]. Held: for child claimants, the decision in [blank_start]Z v UK[blank_end] is not applicable. The [blank_start]Court of Appeal[blank_end] essentially overruled the House of Lords. The parents were not [blank_start]eligible[blank_end] to sue. This only applies where parents are [blank_start]accused[blank_end] of harm.

[blank_start]Brooks v Commissioner of Police[blank_end] C was a friend of [blank_start]Stephen Lawrence[blank_end]. He was [blank_start]mistreated[blank_end] by the police, and accused of [blank_start]stabbing[blank_end] him. This lead C to suffer [blank_start]psychiatric harm[blank_end] so he brought an action against them. Held: claim failed - [blank_start]Hill[blank_end] principle applies. This demonstrates how far the Courts will go to [blank_start]protect[blank_end] the police. Michael v [blank_start]Chief Constable of South Wales Police[blank_end] V was in an [blank_start]abusive relationship[blank_end]. She brought it to an end but her [blank_start]former partner[blank_end] became violent. She called the police but it was [blank_start]uncertain[blank_end] which police service should have responded to her call as she lived on the [blank_start]border[blank_end]. Her call was mistakenly held to be a '[blank_start]non-emergency[blank_end] call', and she was unfortunately [blank_start]killed[blank_end] by her partner in the meantime. Held: [blank_start]Hill principle[blank_end] still applies. Where negligence applies, [blank_start]policy negates[blank_end] liability.

[blank_start]Third party liability[blank_end] Where liability in tort can be imposed on one person for harm actually [blank_start]inflicted[blank_end] by another. It must be distinguished from [blank_start]vicarious liability,[blank_end] a form of [blank_start]no-fault[blank_end] liability. Third party liability is a form of ordinary [blank_start]fault-based[blank_end] liability which is triggered by the [blank_start]conduct of D[blank_end]. Founding case of third party liability: [blank_start]Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co[blank_end] There is an existence of a [blank_start]duty[blank_end] to control the actions of a [blank_start]third party[blank_end] in order to prevent [blank_start]harm[blank_end] being caused to a particular class of [blank_start]victims[blank_end], in situations in which it can be shown: (i) that there is a strong [blank_start]relationship[blank_end] of authority and control between the responsible D and the [blank_start]irresponsible[blank_end] D third party; (ii) that C comes within a [blank_start]narrowly defined[blank_end] class of potential [blank_start]victims[blank_end]; and (iii) that the harm-causing [blank_start]conduct[blank_end] of the third party was at least something [blank_start]very likely[blank_end] to occur in the circumstances. Possible application of HO v Dorset Yacht: (i) Relationship between [blank_start]prison authorities[blank_end] and inmates, to prevent inmates from [blank_start]causing harm[blank_end] to one another ([blank_start]Ellis v Home Office[blank_end]). Duty based on existence of 2 special relationships of proximity - one between D and the third party harmdoer and another as between D and V. Extension of such liability to cover acts of [blank_start]self-harm[blank_end] committed by prisoners known to have such tendencies ([blank_start]Reeves v Commissioner)[blank_end] (ii) Relationship between health [blank_start]authorities and psychiatric patients[blank_end] Palmer v [blank_start]Tees[blank_end] - victim needs a [blank_start]special status[blank_end] ([blank_start]Hill principle[blank_end]). Actions against health authorities based on an alleged failure to prevent them from engaging in [blank_start]criminal behaviour[blank_end] will be excluded on grounds of [blank_start]public policy[blank_end] ([blank_start]Gray v Thames Trains[blank_end]). (iii) [blank_start]Parent-child[blank_end] relationship Policy considerations make it difficult to establish the [blank_start]liability of parents[blank_end] for the acts of their children. An [blank_start]affirmative duty[blank_end] will only arise where the parent has actively contributed to the risk of harm, e.g. by purchasing their child a [blank_start]gun[blank_end] ([blank_start]Newton v Edgerley[blank_end]). Other persons [blank_start]looking after[blank_end] a child are likely to come under this category ([blank_start]Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis[blank_end]) - but note [blank_start]Perry v Harris[blank_end] ([blank_start]breach issue[blank_end]). Parents are not under an automatic duty to protect their children from [blank_start]foreseeable harm[blank_end] ([blank_start]Surtees v Kingston[blank_end]).

Liability in respect of the [blank_start]intoxicated[blank_end] [blank_start]Barrett[blank_end] v MoD and [blank_start]Jebson[blank_end] v MoD - a [blank_start]duty[blank_end] is recognised on the basis of an [blank_start]assumption of responsibility[blank_end]. Note: [blank_start]Everett v Comojo[blank_end] - if you are [blank_start]providing alcohol[blank_end], the harm suffered is [blank_start]foreseeable[blank_end]. A duty is always owed but it won't be [blank_start]breached[blank_end] if harm does occur. Liability in [blank_start]sport[blank_end] [blank_start]Smoldon v Whitworth[blank_end] - referee sued by C, who suffered a [blank_start]spinal injury[blank_end] after a [blank_start]scrum collapsed[blank_end] on top of him, for failing to implement proper [blank_start]safety[blank_end] rules during the game. Held: D was liable because it was his [blank_start]responsibility[blank_end] to ensure the safety of the game. Liability of [blank_start]property owners[blank_end] [blank_start]Clark Fixing Ltd[blank_end] v [blank_start]Dudley[blank_end] Met BC - trespassers caused a fire in an [blank_start]abandoned building[blank_end]. The council were held [blank_start]liable[blank_end] for a breach of duty.

The courts used to not allow claims for [blank_start]psychiatric harm[blank_end] because it is [blank_start]indeterminate[blank_end] and there is no way of [blank_start]testing[blank_end] its [blank_start]existence[blank_end]. ([blank_start]Victoria Railway Commissioners v Coultas[blank_end]) [blank_start]Dulieu[blank_end] v White Held: an action could lie in negligence for [blank_start]nervous shock[blank_end] arising from a [blank_start]reasonable fear[blank_end] for one's own immediate [blank_start]safety[blank_end]. [blank_start]Hambrook v Stoke[blank_end] Held: Although she was outside of the [blank_start]zone of physical danger[blank_end], recovery was allowed - D suffered [blank_start]mental injury[blank_end] as a result of [blank_start]witnessing[blank_end] her children in an accident. McLoughlin v [blank_start]O'Brien[blank_end] Held: It was [blank_start]foreseeable[blank_end] that a [blank_start]mother[blank_end] would visit her husband and child in hospital following an accident, so a [blank_start]duty of care[blank_end] was owed to the mother in respect of [blank_start]psychiatric harm[blank_end].

[blank_start]Primary/secondary[blank_end] victims Alcock v Chief Constable of [blank_start]South Yorkshire Police[blank_end] The Courts wanted to limit liability to avoid opening the [blank_start]floodgates[blank_end] to many claims for [blank_start]psychiatric harm[blank_end] following the [blank_start]Hillsborough disaster[blank_end]. The House of Lords set out the [blank_start]Alcock test[blank_end]. Primary victim: someone involved as a [blank_start]participant[blank_end] in the relevant incident causing psychiatric harm. [blank_start]Secondary victim[blank_end]: individual's psychiatric harm stems from [blank_start]witnessing[blank_end] others injuries. Test: C must satisfy the following criteria: 1. A close tie of [blank_start]love and affection[blank_end] 2. Witness the event with their [blank_start]own unaided senses[blank_end] 3. [blank_start]Proximity[blank_end] to the event itself or its [blank_start]immediate aftermath[blank_end] 4. Psychiatric injury must be a result of a [blank_start]shocking event[blank_end]

Galli-Atkinson v [blank_start]Seghal[blank_end] Claim brought by the mother of a girl who was [blank_start]killed in a road acciden[blank_end]t. She was told that she wasn't allowed to see her daughter in the [blank_start]morgue[blank_end]. When she eventually did see her two hours later, she suffered [blank_start]psychiatric harm[blank_end] as a result. Held: 2 hours is [blank_start]close proximity[blank_end], therefore the [blank_start]Alcock[blank_end] test could be [blank_start]satisfied[blank_end]. [blank_start]Taylor v A Novo[blank_end], Brock v [blank_start]NHS[blank_end] and Wild v [blank_start]Southend[blank_end] University Hospital: There needs to be [blank_start]suddenness[blank_end] for psychiatric harm to establish [blank_start]proximity[blank_end] in time and space.

[blank_start]Page v Smith[blank_end] Clarified the position of [blank_start]primary[blank_end] victims. Must prove you were in the [blank_start]zone[blank_end] and the harm was [blank_start]unforeseeable[blank_end].

White v Chief Constable of [blank_start]South Yorkshire[blank_end] Claim brought by [blank_start]police officers[blank_end] who had carried dead bodies at the [blank_start]Hillsborough[blank_end] disaster. They argued for [blank_start]special status[blank_end]. Held: it would not be in the [blank_start]public interest[blank_end] to grant them special status. They needed to satisfy the [blank_start]Alcock test[blank_end] like everybody else. [blank_start]Greatorex v Greatorex[blank_end] Held: C did not satisfy the [blank_start]secondary victim[blank_end] test. The court introduced an extra stage for [blank_start]policy reasons[blank_end]. There was no duty of care owed because it would be bad for [blank_start]family relations[blank_end] and they didn't want D to be sued in cases where harm was [blank_start]self-inflicted[blank_end]. It interferes with [blank_start]individual liberty[blank_end]. [blank_start]Rothwell v Chemical[blank_end] & Insulating Co Pleural plaques alone = not [blank_start]actionable damage[blank_end] (were previously). Knowledge that they were in C's [blank_start]system[blank_end] caused him [blank_start]psychiatric[blank_end] harm. Court threw out the claim at the DOC stage - only applies to [blank_start]individuals[blank_end] who have fear from a [blank_start]past event[blank_end]. His harm related to fear that something may occur in the [blank_start]future[blank_end] - harm therefore not [blank_start]reasonably foreseeable[blank_end].

Problems with the [blank_start]primary/secondary[blank_end] victim distinction W v [blank_start]Essex CC[blank_end] [blank_start]Foster family[blank_end] given a boy who had sexually assaulted his own [blank_start]sister[blank_end]. The local authority knew. Their own [blank_start]children[blank_end] were then [blank_start]assaulted[blank_end]. The parents suffered psychological [blank_start]harm[blank_end] as a result. Held: the parents were [blank_start]primary victims[blank_end] - the [blank_start]zone of physical danger[blank_end] could be [blank_start]extended[blank_end] in this case. [blank_start]Farrell v Avon Health Authority[blank_end] Father went to see his [blank_start]newborn[blank_end] baby, but the nurse mistakenly [blank_start]informed[blank_end] him that it had [blank_start]died[blank_end]. He suffered [blank_start]psychological[blank_end] harm as a result. Held: father was a [blank_start]primary victim[blank_end]. Policy decision: the Court wouldn't expect many of these [blank_start]victims[blank_end] so the [blank_start]floodgates[blank_end] wouldn't open.

[blank_start]Occupational[blank_end] stress claims Hatton v [blank_start]Sutherland[blank_end] and [blank_start]Barber v Somerset[blank_end] CC Issue of [blank_start]breach[blank_end] disputed - the House of Lords confirmed the [blank_start]reasonable foreseeability[blank_end] idea. Daw v Intel Corporation Referral to [blank_start]off-health[blank_end] does not satisfy a duty. Butchart v [blank_start]Home Office[blank_end] Psychiatric harm was [blank_start]reasonably foreseeable[blank_end], therefore a duty was owed. [blank_start]Attia v British Gas[blank_end] C suffered psychiatric harm as a result of [blank_start]witnessing[blank_end] her own [blank_start]home[blank_end] blow up. Held: a [blank_start]duty of care[blank_end] is owed because it is [blank_start]reasonably foreseeable[blank_end] that you would suffer [blank_start]psychological harm[blank_end] in relation to your own [blank_start]property[blank_end].

[blank_start]Economic loss[blank_end] General principle in negligence = [blank_start]no recovery[blank_end] for pure economic loss ([blank_start]Spartan Steel[blank_end]). Spartan Steel - authority for the distinction between [blank_start]pure economic loss[blank_end] and [blank_start]consequential[blank_end] economic loss. Pure economic loss and [blank_start]property damage[blank_end] [blank_start]Anns v Merton[blank_end] London BC Tried to convert [blank_start]pure economic loss[blank_end] to property damage so that C could recover in [blank_start]negligence[blank_end]. However, the property was already [blank_start]damaged[blank_end] when C bought it. The court said that [blank_start]personal safety[blank_end] could be linked to [blank_start]pure economic loss[blank_end] as a special case of [blank_start]property damage[blank_end]. Held: it was a case of pure economic loss, so C [blank_start]couldn't[blank_end] recover. [blank_start]D & F Estates[blank_end] v Church Commissioners of England Tried to further justify the [blank_start]Anns decision[blank_end] and defective buildings as being property damage. [blank_start]Complex structure theory[blank_end]: if structure was made up of [blank_start]different components[blank_end] and only 1 structure was defective, the individual component would be treated as [blank_start]pure economic loss[blank_end]. If it affected other components, it would be [blank_start]property damage[blank_end]. Murphy v [blank_start]Brentwood[blank_end] DC House defective with faulty [blank_start]foundations[blank_end]. House of Lords said it was [blank_start]pure economic loss[blank_end], which cannot be recovered. [blank_start]Hedley Byrne v Heller[blank_end] C's interested in entering into [blank_start]business dealings[blank_end] and asked to obtain a [blank_start]bank reference[blank_end] from the D bank. It indicated that they were financially stable when they weren't. C lost £17k, but couldn't recover. They sued the bank for the [blank_start]careless[blank_end] reference. The case failed because D had issued a [blank_start]valid disclaimer[blank_end]. However, if there was no valid disclaimer, a small exception could be narrowly applied: There must be an [blank_start]assumption of responsibility[blank_end], and C must rely on that assumption to their detriment. Esso Petroleum v Mardon Held: Esso had assumed [blank_start]responsibility[blank_end] and had knowledge of the potential consequences. They were held liable. Chaudhry v Prabhakar Held: D had assumed responsibility for the financial interest of his friend, so he was [blank_start]under a duty[blank_end] and was therefore liable. [blank_start]Caparo v Dickman[blank_end] Held: Hedley Byrne applied but not satisfied - [blank_start]no duty of care[blank_end] was owed. There was not sufficient proximity between Caparo and the auditors since the auditors were not aware of the existence of [blank_start]Caparo[blank_end] nor the purpose for which the accounts were being used by them. [blank_start]Smith v Eric Bush[blank_end] C bought a house relying on a survey carried out by D. D carelessly valued the house for more than it was worth. C bought the house and wanted to sue D for pure economic loss. The court said that C was financially naive in that she should have got a [blank_start]second opinion[blank_end], so therefore a Hedley Byrne relationship was not satisfied. James McNaughton v [blank_start]Hicks Anderson[blank_end] Six factors set out by [blank_start]Lord Neill[blank_end] - but they don't operate in a mechanical fashion: (1) the purpose for which the statement was made. (2) the purpose for which the [blank_start]statement[blank_end] was communicated . (3) the relationship between the advisor, the advisee and any relevant third party. (4) the size of any class to which the advisee belongs. (5) the state of knowledge of the advisor. (6) [blank_start]reliance by the advisee[blank_end] [blank_start]Lennon[blank_end] v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis Claimant was a police officer. He wanted to apply to go to the police service in Northern Ireland. Whilst in the Metropolitan police force, he benefited from an [blank_start]allowance[blank_end] - he wanted to know if he would still benefit from it in Northern Ireland. He rang the police station in London and asked, and they said that he would, when actually they had no idea. In reliance, he went ahead with the transfer. He lost money so sued D, on the basis of a [blank_start]Hedley Byrne[blank_end] relationship. West Bromwich FC v El-Softy Footballer suffered a knee injury. He consulted the D doctor who said he was fine, but he then suffered further damage. The club lost out on his transfer value, so they brought a claim. Held: the claim failed because the relevant [blank_start]Hedley Byrne relationship[blank_end] existed between the Dr and player, not the club. ([blank_start]Common sense approach[blank_end]). Customs v Excise and Barclays Bank Suggested there was no need for a [blank_start]Hedley Byrne test.[blank_end] Caparo just needed to be applied. This is an example of the courts trying to make the law more simplified. Held: D had not assumed responsibility - they had no [blank_start]interest[blank_end] in C, so no duty was owed. [blank_start]Jain v Trent Strategic[blank_end] HA Held: the local authority had statutory obligations, and if they are able to carry out their primary purpose, no duty was owed to C. Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Hedley Byrne relationships can extend in application to services. [blank_start]Spring v Guardian Assurance[blank_end] C = employee of D, and had asked for a job reference. D provided a careless reference, so C didn't get the job. This gave rise to a Hedley Byrne relationship, so D was liable. [blank_start]White v Jones[blank_end] D solicitors drew up a will for C's father. Will excluded C as beneficiaries because of a disagreement, but he later asked the will to be changed. The solicitors never changed it so C wanted to sue the [blank_start]solicitors[blank_end] for the money lost. Held: there was a [blank_start]duty of care[blank_end], despite the fact that there was no direct reliance. [blank_start]Gorham v BT[blank_end] C was carelessly advised to take out a pension that could not [blank_start]support[blank_end] the family. The wife sued in negligence. Held: Hedley Byrne relationship established.